| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10423 |
| DP10423 State Capitalism vs. Private Enterprise | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the efficiency of internal capital markets at state-controlled and privately owned business groups in China. Using highly granular data on within-group capital flows, we document stark differences: while private groups allocate more capital to units with better investment opportunities, state groups do the opposite. Minority shareholders in state owned firms suffer as a result. Product market competition and external monitoring by outside investors help discipline state groups? tendency to ignore investment opportunities. We conjecture that capital allocations at state groups reflect the private career objectives of their chairmen. We show that promotion depends not on increasing profitability but on avoiding layoffs. Consistent with a career motive, we find that capital allocations are used to prop up large and struggling employers, but only if the chairman has a realistic chance of being promoted and if the cost of self-interested behavior is not too high. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Business groups Internal capital markets Private enterprise State capitalism |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10423 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539255 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist. DP10423 State Capitalism vs. Private Enterprise. 2015. |
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