| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10438 |
| DP10438 The quality-assuring role of mutual fund advisory fees | |
| Michel Habib | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-22 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Active fund managers implicitly promise to research profitable portfolio selection. But active management is an experience good subject to moral hazard. Investors cannot tell high from low quality up front and therefore fear manager shirking. We show how the parties mitigate the moral hazard by paying the manager a premium fee sufficiently high that the manager's one-time gain from shirking is less than the capitalized value of the premium stream he earns from maintaining his promise to provide high quality. Premium advisory fees act as a quality-assuring bond. Our model has a number of revealing extensions and comparative statics. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Excessive fees Advisory fees Quality-assurance Open-access Closet indexing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10438 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539269 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michel Habib. DP10438 The quality-assuring role of mutual fund advisory fees. 2015. |
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