| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10458 |
| DP10458 Collective Self Control | |
| Alessandro Lizzeri; Leeat Yariv | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Behavioral economics presents a "paternalistic" rationale for a benevolent government's intervention. We consider an economy where the only ?distortion? is agents? time inconsistency. We study the desirability of various forms of collective action, ones pertaining to costly commitment and ones pertaining to the timing of consumption, when government decisions respond to voters? preferences via the political process. If only commitment decisions are centralized, commitment investment is more moderate than if all decisions are centralized. Commitment investment is minimal when only consumption is centralized. First-period welfare is highest under either full centralization or laissez faire, depending on the populations? time-inconsistency distribution. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Behavioral political economy Time inconsistency Hyperbolic discounting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10458 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539290 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Lizzeri,Leeat Yariv. DP10458 Collective Self Control. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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