| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10466 |
| DP10466 Deliberating Collective Decisions | |
| Alessandro Lizzeri; Leeat Yariv; Jimmy Chan; Wing Suen | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date agents decide whether to vote to adopt one of two alternatives or continue to collect more information. The process stops when a qualified majority vote for an alternative. Three main insights emerge from our analysis and match an array of stylized facts on committee decision making. First, majority rule is more fragile than super-majority rules to impatient committee members. Second, more diverse preferences, more consensual deliberation rules, or more unanimous de- cision voting rules lead to lengthier deliberation and more accurate decisions. Last, balanced committees unanimously prefer to delegate deliberation power to a moderate chairman rather than be governed by a deliberation rule such as unanimity. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Collec- tive learning Optimal stopping Sequential likelihood ratio test Swing voters |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10466 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539298 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Lizzeri,Leeat Yariv,Jimmy Chan,et al. DP10466 Deliberating Collective Decisions. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
