| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10473 |
| DP10473 Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets | |
| Fabiano Schivardi; Gregory Crawford; Nicola Pavanini | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing, and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of demand for credit and default. Our counterfactual experiments show that while increases in adverse selection increase prices and defaults on average, reducing credit supply, banks? market power can mitigate these negative effects. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Assymetric information Credit markets Imperfect competition Lending markets |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10473 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539305 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabiano Schivardi,Gregory Crawford,Nicola Pavanini. DP10473 Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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