G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10476
DP10476 Forced Asset Sales and the Concentration of Outstanding Debt: Evidence from the Mortgage Market
Giovanni Favara; Mariassunta Giannetti
发表日期2015-03-08
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要We provide evidence that lenders differ in their ex post incentives to internalize price-default externalities associated with the liquidation of collateralized debt. Using the mortgage market as a laboratory, we conjecture that lenders with a large share of outstanding mortgages on their balance sheets internalize the negative spillovers associated with the liquidation of defaulting mortgages and are thus less inclined to foreclose. We find that zip codes with higher concentration of outstanding mortgages experience fewer foreclosures, more renegotiations of delinquent mortgages, and smaller house prices declines. These results are not driven by prior local economic conditions, mortgage securitization or unobservable lender characteristics.
主题Financial Economics
关键词House prices Foreclosures Bank concentration Fire sales
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10476
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539308
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Giovanni Favara,Mariassunta Giannetti. DP10476 Forced Asset Sales and the Concentration of Outstanding Debt: Evidence from the Mortgage Market. 2015.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Giovanni Favara]的文章
[Mariassunta Giannetti]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Giovanni Favara]的文章
[Mariassunta Giannetti]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Giovanni Favara]的文章
[Mariassunta Giannetti]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。