| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10481 |
| DP10481 Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory | |
| Micael Castanheira; Laurent Bouton; Aniol Llorente-Saguer | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an assumption in those models: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose the first direct empirical evidence of the effect of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections. Adopting a theory-based experimental approach, we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non-Duverger's law equilibria in plurality elections. Our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions: sincere voting is a predominant strategy under aggregate uncertainty, whereas without aggregate uncertainty, voters massively coordinate their votes behind one candidate, who wins almost surely. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Aggregate uncertainty Experiments Multicandidate elections Plurality Rational-voter model |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10481 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539313 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Micael Castanheira,Laurent Bouton,Aniol Llorente-Saguer. DP10481 Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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