| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10493 |
| DP10493 Treasure Hunt: Social Learning in the Field | |
| Adam Szeidl | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-15 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We seed noisy information to members of a real-world social network to study how information diffusion and information aggregation jointly shape social learning. Our environment features substantial social learning. We show that learning occurs via diffusion which is highly imperfect: signals travel only up to two steps in the conversation network and indirect signals are transmitted noisily. We then compare two theories of information aggregation: a naive model in which people double-count signals that reach them through multiple paths, and a sophisticated model in which people avoid double-counting by tagging the source of information. We show that to distinguish between these models of aggregation, it is critical to explicitly account for imperfect diffusion. When we do so, we find that our data are most consistent with the sophisticated tagged model. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Information aggregation Information diffusion Networks Social learning |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10493 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539325 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Adam Szeidl. DP10493 Treasure Hunt: Social Learning in the Field. 2015. |
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