| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10505 |
| DP10505 Insecure Debt | |
| Enrico Perotti | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-22 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study bank funding choices under asset liquidity risk and a realistic bankruptcy process, where illiquid assets are shared among all unpaid creditors. Repo debt is cheap and stable but shifts risk to unsecured debt. In the unique equilibrium, repo has a nonmonotonic effect. Runs are rare when unpledged liquid assets are abundant, rise as more repo funding shifts risk, and ultimately fall as less liquidity is available for early withdrawals. The socially optimal choice minimizes inefficient runs by limiting repo or by subsidizing a high rollover yield on unsecured debt. The private choice uses more repo and a lower rollover reward, trading off runs against cheaper funding |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank runs Haircuts Repo Secured credit |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10505 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539336 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Enrico Perotti. DP10505 Insecure Debt. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Enrico Perotti]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Enrico Perotti]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Enrico Perotti]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
