| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10506 |
| DP10506 Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions? | |
| Marco Becht; Stefano Rossi; ANDREA POLO | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-22 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Previous studies of voting on acquisitions are inconclusive because shareholder approval in the United States is discretionary for management. We study the U.K. where approval is mandatory for deals that exceed a multivariate relative size threshold. We find that in the U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $13.6 billion over 1992-2010 in aggregate; without voting U.K. shareholders lost $3 billion. U.S. shareholders lost $214 billion in matched deals. Differences-in-differences and regression discontinuity analyses support a causal interpretation. The evidence suggests that mandatory voting imposes a binding constraint on acquirer CEOs. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate acquisitions Shareholder voting Corporate governance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10506 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539337 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Becht,Stefano Rossi,ANDREA POLO. DP10506 Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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