G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10510
DP10510 Uncertainty Aversion and Systemic Risk
Paolo Fulghieri; David Dicks
发表日期2015-03-29
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要We propose a new theory of systemic risk based on Knightian uncertainty (or "ambiguity"). We show that, due to uncertainty aversion, beliefs on future asset returns are endogenous, and bad news on one asset class induces investors to be more pessimistic about other asset classes as well. This means that idiosyncratic risk can create contagion and snowball into systemic risk. Furthermore, in a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setting, we show that, surprisingly, uncertainty aversion causes investors to be less prone to run individual banks, but runs will be systemic. In addition, we show that bank runs are associated with stock market crashes and flight to quality. Finally, we argue that increasing uncertainty makes the financial system more fragile and more prone to crises. We conclude with implications for the current public policy debate on the management of financial crisis
主题Financial Economics
关键词ambiguity aversion Bank runs Financial crises Systemic risk
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10510
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539342
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Paolo Fulghieri,David Dicks. DP10510 Uncertainty Aversion and Systemic Risk. 2015.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Paolo Fulghieri]的文章
[David Dicks]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Paolo Fulghieri]的文章
[David Dicks]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Paolo Fulghieri]的文章
[David Dicks]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。