| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10514 |
| DP10514 So Closed: Political Selection in Proportional Systems | |
| Vincenzo Galasso; Tommaso Nannicini | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-29 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze political selection in a closed list proportional system where parties have strong gate-keeping power, which they use as an instrument to pursue votes. Parties face a trade-off between selecting loyal candidates or experts, who are highly valued by the voters and thus increase the probability of winning the election. Voters can be rational or behavioral. The former care about the quality mix of the elected candidates in the winning party, and hence about the ordering on the party list. The latter only concentrate on the quality type of the candidates in the top positions of the party list. Our theoretical model shows that, to persuade rational voters, parties optimally allocate loyalists to safe seats and experts to uncertain positions. Persuading behavioral voters instead requires to position the experts visibly on top of the electoral list. Our empirical analysis, which uses data from the 2013 National election in Italy---held under closed list proportional representation---and from independent pre-electoral polls, is overall supportive of voters' rational behavior. Loyalists (i.e., party officers or former members of Parliament who mostly voted along party lines) are overrepresented in safe positions, and, within both safe and uncertain positions, they are ranked higher in the list. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Closed party lists Electoral rule Political selection |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10514 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539346 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vincenzo Galasso,Tommaso Nannicini. DP10514 So Closed: Political Selection in Proportional Systems. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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