| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10526 |
| DP10526 Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections | |
| Bang Dang Nguyen; Quoc-Anh Do; Yen-Teik Lee | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-04-05 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political connections are more valuable for firms connected to winning challengers, for smaller and financially dependent firms, in more corrupt states, in states of connected firms? headquarters and operations, and in closer, smaller, and active networks. Post-election, firms connected to the winner receive significantly more state procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Close gubernatorial election Corruption Firm value Political connection Procurement Regression discontinuity design Social Networks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10526 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539358 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bang Dang Nguyen,Quoc-Anh Do,Yen-Teik Lee. DP10526 Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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