| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10560 |
| DP10560 Government Guarantees and Financial Stability | |
| Franklin Allen; Elena Carletti; Itay Goldstein; Agnese Leonello | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-04-26 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Government guarantees to financial institutions are intended to reduce the likelihood of runs and bank failures, but are also usually associated with distortions in banks? risk taking decisions. We build a model to analyze these trade-offs based on the global-games literature and its application to bank runs. We derive several results, some of which against common wisdom. First, guarantees reduce the probability of a run, taking as given the amount of bank risk taking, but lead banks to take more risk, which in turn might lead to an increase in the probability of a run. Second, guarantees against fundamental-based failures and panic-based runs may lead to more efficiency than guarantees against panic-based runs alone. Finally, there are cases where following the introduction of guarantees banks take less risk than would be optimal. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Panic runs Fundamental runs Government guarantees Bank moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10560 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539392 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Franklin Allen,Elena Carletti,Itay Goldstein,et al. DP10560 Government Guarantees and Financial Stability. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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