| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP10566
|
| DP10566 Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer |
| Xavier Gabaix; Alex Edmans
|
| 发表日期 | 2015-05-03
|
| 出版年 | 2015
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We make two broad points. First, traditional optimal contracting theories find it difficult to explain the data, suggesting that compensation results from 'rent extraction' by CEOs. In contrast, more modern theories that arguably better capture the CEO setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for tractability or convenience, can lead to significant differences in the model's implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices. We close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Contract theory
Executive compensation
Optimal contracting
Principal-agent problem
Rent extraction
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10566
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539398
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Xavier Gabaix,Alex Edmans. DP10566 Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer. 2015.
|
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