| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10572 |
| DP10572 The effect of audit regimes on applications for long-term care | |
| Maarten Lindeboom; Bas van der Klaauw | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-05-03 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the effects of various audit regimes, differing in the degree of control and the presence of performance incentives, on behavior of care providers filing applications for providing long-term care services to patients. We present evidence from a large-scale field experiment in the Dutch market for long-term care. We find that increasing the degree of control reduces the number of applications and that introducing performance incentives reduces this even further. However, we find evidence for substitution with other types of long-term care services, which are often less extensive. Finally, we find detrimental effects on audit approval rates, but we provide some results showing that assessors are less strict when audits do not have direct implications. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Auditing Field experiment Incentives Long-term care |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10572 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539404 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maarten Lindeboom,Bas van der Klaauw. DP10572 The effect of audit regimes on applications for long-term care. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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