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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP10576 |
DP10576 Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence | |
Winand Emons; Jan Lang | |
发表日期 | 2015-05-03 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Increasing penalty structures for repeat offenses are ubiquitous in penal codes, despite little empirical or theoretical support. Multi-period models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of Becker (1968) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat or declining. We experimentally test a two-stage theoretical model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater deterrence than increasing penalty structures. We find that decreasing fine structures are more effective at reducing risky behavior. Additionally, our econometric analyses reveal a number of behavioral findings. Subjects are deterred by past convictions, even though the probability of detection is independent across decisions. Further, subjects appear to take the two-stage nature of the decision making task into account, suggesting that subjects consider both current and future penalties. Even controlling for the fine a subject faces for any given decision, being in a decreasing fine structure has a significant effect on deterrence. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Crime and punishment Deterrence Experimental evidence Repeat offenders |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10576 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539408 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Winand Emons,Jan Lang. DP10576 Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence. 2015. |
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