| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10579 |
| DP10579 Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information | |
| Aner Sela; Yizhaq Minchuk | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-05-10 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a two-stage sequential search model with two agents who compete for one job. The agents arrive sequentially, each one in a different stage. The agents' abilities are private information and they are derived from heterogeneous distribution functions. In each stage the designer chooses an ability threshold. If an agent has a higher ability than the ability threshold in the stage in which he arrives, he gets the job and the search is over. We analyze the equilibrium ability thresholds imposed by the designer who wishes to maximize the ability of the agent who gets the job minus the search cost. We also investigate the ratio of the equilibrium ability thresholds as well as the optimal allocation of agents in both stages according to the agents' distributions of abilities. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Sequential search |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10579 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539411 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aner Sela,Yizhaq Minchuk. DP10579 Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Aner Sela]的文章 |
| [Yizhaq Minchuk]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Aner Sela]的文章 |
| [Yizhaq Minchuk]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Aner Sela]的文章 |
| [Yizhaq Minchuk]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
