G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10582
DP10582 Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes
Georg Kirchsteiger; Maurizio Zanardi; Paola Conconi; David DeRemer; Lorenzo Trimarchi
发表日期2015-05-10
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要This paper shows that electoral incentives affect the occurrence of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2012 period, we show that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election date. Moreover, disputes filed by the U.S. tend to target industries that are important to swing states in the presidential election. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which an incumbent can file a trade dispute to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity. The incumbent?s ability to initiate a dispute during the re-election campaign provides an advantage over the challenger, who cannot commit to file the dispute if elected. If voters? ideological preferences are not too strong in favor of either candidate, the incumbent will file a trade dispute to increase his re-election chances.
主题International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词Elections Reciprocity Trade disputes
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10582
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539414
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Georg Kirchsteiger,Maurizio Zanardi,Paola Conconi,et al. DP10582 Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes. 2015.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Georg Kirchsteiger]的文章
[Maurizio Zanardi]的文章
[Paola Conconi]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Georg Kirchsteiger]的文章
[Maurizio Zanardi]的文章
[Paola Conconi]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Georg Kirchsteiger]的文章
[Maurizio Zanardi]的文章
[Paola Conconi]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。