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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP10582 |
DP10582 Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes | |
Georg Kirchsteiger; Maurizio Zanardi; Paola Conconi; David DeRemer; Lorenzo Trimarchi | |
发表日期 | 2015-05-10 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper shows that electoral incentives affect the occurrence of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2012 period, we show that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election date. Moreover, disputes filed by the U.S. tend to target industries that are important to swing states in the presidential election. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which an incumbent can file a trade dispute to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity. The incumbent?s ability to initiate a dispute during the re-election campaign provides an advantage over the challenger, who cannot commit to file the dispute if elected. If voters? ideological preferences are not too strong in favor of either candidate, the incumbent will file a trade dispute to increase his re-election chances. |
主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
关键词 | Elections Reciprocity Trade disputes |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10582 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539414 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georg Kirchsteiger,Maurizio Zanardi,Paola Conconi,et al. DP10582 Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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