| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10603 |
| DP10603 Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement | |
| Monica Singhal; Dina Pomeranz; Paul Carrillo | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-05-17 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Reducing tax evasion is a key priority for many governments, particularly in developing countries. A growing literature argues that cross-checks of taxpayer reports against third-party information are critical for effective tax enforcement. However, such cross-checks may have limited effectiveness if taxpayers can make offsetting adjustments on other margins. We present a simple framework demonstrating conditions under which this occurs and empirical evidence from a natural experiment in Ecuador. When firms are notified about detected revenue discrepancies, they increase reported revenues - but also reported costs (by 96 cents per dollar of revenue adjustment), resulting in minor increases in tax collection. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Ecuador Evasion Tax |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10603 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539435 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Monica Singhal,Dina Pomeranz,Paul Carrillo. DP10603 Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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