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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP10603 |
DP10603 Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement | |
Monica Singhal; Dina Pomeranz; Paul Carrillo | |
发表日期 | 2015-05-17 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Reducing tax evasion is a key priority for many governments, particularly in developing countries. A growing literature argues that cross-checks of taxpayer reports against third-party information are critical for effective tax enforcement. However, such cross-checks may have limited effectiveness if taxpayers can make offsetting adjustments on other margins. We present a simple framework demonstrating conditions under which this occurs and empirical evidence from a natural experiment in Ecuador. When firms are notified about detected revenue discrepancies, they increase reported revenues - but also reported costs (by 96 cents per dollar of revenue adjustment), resulting in minor increases in tax collection. |
主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
关键词 | Ecuador Evasion Tax |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10603 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539435 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Monica Singhal,Dina Pomeranz,Paul Carrillo. DP10603 Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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