G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10603
DP10603 Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement
Monica Singhal; Dina Pomeranz; Paul Carrillo
发表日期2015-05-17
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要Reducing tax evasion is a key priority for many governments, particularly in developing countries. A growing literature argues that cross-checks of taxpayer reports against third-party information are critical for effective tax enforcement. However, such cross-checks may have limited effectiveness if taxpayers can make offsetting adjustments on other margins. We present a simple framework demonstrating conditions under which this occurs and empirical evidence from a natural experiment in Ecuador. When firms are notified about detected revenue discrepancies, they increase reported revenues - but also reported costs (by 96 cents per dollar of revenue adjustment), resulting in minor increases in tax collection.
主题Development Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Ecuador Evasion Tax
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10603
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539435
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Monica Singhal,Dina Pomeranz,Paul Carrillo. DP10603 Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement. 2015.
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