| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10614 |
| DP10614 Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity | |
| Thomas Philippon; Joseba Martinez; Miguel Faria e castro | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-05-24 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We characterize the optimal use of information disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. In our model, financial crises force governments to choose between runs and lemons. Revealing information about banks? assets reduces adverse selection in credit markets, but it can also create inefficient runs on weak banks. A fiscal backstop mitigates this risk and allows the government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. A government with a strong fiscal position is more likely to run informative stress tests than a government with a weak fiscal position. As a result, such a government is also less likely to rely on outright bailouts. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Bailouts Credit guarantees Deposit insurance Fiscal backstop Stress tests |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10614 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539446 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Philippon,Joseba Martinez,Miguel Faria e castro. DP10614 Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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