| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10634 |
| DP10634 Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs | |
| Sven Rady; Paul Heidhues; Philipp Strack | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-05-31 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a game of strategic experimentation in which players face identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider problem is so severe that equilibrium experimentation ceases at the same threshold belief at which a single agent would stop, even if players can coordinate their actions through mediated communication. When payoffs are private information and the success probability on the risky arm is not too high, however, the socially optimal symmetric experimentation profile can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for sufficiently optimistic prior beliefs, even if players can only communicate via binary cheap-talk messages. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bayesian learning Cheap talk Information externality Mediated communication Strategic experimentation Two-armed bandit |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10634 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539466 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sven Rady,Paul Heidhues,Philipp Strack. DP10634 Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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