全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP10643 Can helping the sick hurt the able? Incentives, information and disruption in a disability-related welfare reform

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP10643
	DP10643 Can helping the sick hurt the able? Incentives, information and disruption in a disability-related welfare reform
	John Van Reenen; Barbara Petrongolo; Nitika Bagaria
发表日期	2015-06-07
出版年	2015
语种	英语
摘要	Disability rolls have escalated in developed nations over the last 40 years. The UK, however, stands out because the numbers on these benefits stopped rising when a welfare reform was introduced that integrated disability benefits with unemployment insurance (UI). This policy reform improved job information and sharpened bureaucratic incentives to find jobs for the disabled (relative to those on UI). We exploit the fact that the policy was rolled-out quasi-randomly across geographical areas. In the long-run the policy improved the outflows from disability benefits by 6% and had an (insignificant) 1% increase in unemployment outflows. This is consistent with a model where information helps both groups, but bureaucrats were given incentives to shift effort towards helping the disabled find jobs and away from helping the unemployed. Interestingly, in the short-run the policy had a negative impact for both groups, suggesting important disruption effects. We estimate that it takes about six years for the estimated benefits of the reform to exceed its costs, which is beyond the time horizon of most policy-makers.
主题	Labour Economics
关键词	Incentives Performance standards Public sector Unemployment benefits
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp10643
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539475
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	John Van Reenen,Barbara Petrongolo,Nitika Bagaria. DP10643 Can helping the sick hurt the able? Incentives, information and disruption in a disability-related welfare reform. 2015.