| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10656 |
| DP10656 The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice | |
| Hessel Oosterbeek; Pieter A. Gautier; Bas van der Klaauw; Monique de Haan | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-06-14 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Theory points to a potential trade-off between two main school assignment mechanisms; Boston and Deferred Acceptance (DA). While DA is strategy-proof and gives a stable matching, Boston might outperform DA in terms of ex-ante efficiency. We quantify the (dis)advantages of the mechanisms by using information about actual choices under Boston complemented with survey data eliciting students' school preferences. We find that under Boston around 8% of the students apply to another school than their most-preferred school. We compare allocations resulting from Boston with DA with single tie-breaking (one central lottery; DA-STB) and multiple tie-breaking (separate lottery per school; DA-MTB). DA-STB places more students in their top-n schools, for any n, than Boston and results in higher average welfare. We find a trade-off between DA-STB and DA-MTB. DA-STB places more students in their single most-preferred school than DA-MTB, but fewer in their top-n, for n >= 2. Finally, students from disadvantaged backgrounds benefit most from a switch from Boston to any of the DA mechanisms. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | School choice Boston mechanism Deferred acceptance mechanism Strategic behavior Ex-ante efficiency Ex-post efficiency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10656 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539488 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hessel Oosterbeek,Pieter A. Gautier,Bas van der Klaauw,et al. DP10656 The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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