| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10686 |
| DP10686 Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-07-05 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. Who should be the owner of the public project? In an incomplete contracting model in which ex post negotiations are without frictions, the party that values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of technological aspects. However, under the plausible assumption that there are bargaining frictions, the optimal ownership structure depends on technological aspects and on the parties' valuations. We show that the differences between incomplete contracting models with public goods and private goods are thus smaller than has previously been thought. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Investment incentives Bargaining frictions Incomplete contracts Ownership Public goods |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10686 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539518 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP10686 Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions. 2015. |
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