| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10687 |
| DP10687 Coercive Trade Policy | |
| Giovanni Facchini; Vincent Anesi | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-07-05 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Empirical evidence suggests trade coercion exercised unilaterally is significantly less likely to induce concessions than coercion exercised through an international organization. In this paper we build a two-country model of coercion that can provide a rationale for this finding, and for how ``weak'' international institutions might be effective, even if their rulings cannot be directly enforced. In particular we show that if coercion is unilateral, the country requesting the policy change will demand a concession so substantial to make it unacceptable to its partner, and a trade war will ensue. If the parties can instead commit to an international organization (IO), compliance is more likely, because the potential IO ruling places a cap on the Foreign government's incentives to signal its resolve. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Dispute settlement Gatt Political economy Wto |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10687 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539519 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giovanni Facchini,Vincent Anesi. DP10687 Coercive Trade Policy. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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