| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10700 |
| DP10700 Optimally Vague Contracts and the Law | |
| Nicola Gennaioli; Giacomo Ponzetto | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-07-12 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many real-world contracts contain vague clauses despite the enforcement risk they entail. To study the causes and consequences of this phenomenon, we build a principal-agent model in which contracts can include vague clauses whose enforcement may be distorted by opportunistic litigants and biased judges. We find three results. First, the optimal contract is vague, even if courts are very imperfect. Second, the use of vague clauses is a public good: it promotes the evolution of precedents, so future contracts become more complete, incentives higher powered, and surplus larger. Third, as precedents evolve, vague contracts spread from sophisticated to unsophisticated parties, expanding market size. Our model sheds light on the evolution and diffusion of business-format franchising and equity finance. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Contracts Imperfect enforcement Legal evolution Precedents |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10700 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539531 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicola Gennaioli,Giacomo Ponzetto. DP10700 Optimally Vague Contracts and the Law. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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