全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP10721 The Political Economy of Public Income Volatility: With an Application to the Resource Curse

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP10721
	DP10721 The Political Economy of Public Income Volatility: With an Application to the Resource Curse
	Thierry Verdier; James Robinson; Ragnar Torvik
发表日期	2015-07-19
出版年	2015
语种	英语
摘要	We develop a model of the political consequences of public income volatility. As is standard, political incentives create inefficient policies, but we show that making income uncertain creates specific new effects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy more efficient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future, this makes inefficient policy less costly. We show how this model can help think about the connection between volatility and economic growth and in the case where volatility comes from volatile natural resource prices, a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself is a source of inefficient resource extraction.
主题	Development Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Public Economics
关键词	Resource extraction Income volatility Public policy Politics
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp10721
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539552
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Thierry Verdier,James Robinson,Ragnar Torvik. DP10721 The Political Economy of Public Income Volatility: With an Application to the Resource Curse. 2015.