G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10729
DP10729 Seniority Wages and the Role of Firms in Retirement
Rudolf Winter-Ebmer; Gerard Thomas Horvath; Wolfgang Frimmel
发表日期2015-07-19
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要In general, retirement is seen as a pure labor supply phenomenon, but firms can have strong incentives to send expensive older workers into retirement. Based on the seniority wage model developed by Lazear (1979), we discuss steep seniority wage profiles as incentives for firms to dismiss older workers before retirement. Conditional on individual retirement incentives, e.g., social security wealth or health status, the steepness of the wage profile will have different incentives for workers as compared to firms when it comes to the retirement date. Using an instrumental variable approach to account for selection of workers in our firms and for reverse causality, we find that firms with higher labor costs for older workers are associated with lower job exit age.
主题Labour Economics
关键词Firm incentives Retirement Seniority wages
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10729
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539560
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rudolf Winter-Ebmer,Gerard Thomas Horvath,Wolfgang Frimmel. DP10729 Seniority Wages and the Role of Firms in Retirement. 2015.
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