| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10729 |
| DP10729 Seniority Wages and the Role of Firms in Retirement | |
| Rudolf Winter-Ebmer; Gerard Thomas Horvath; Wolfgang Frimmel | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-07-19 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In general, retirement is seen as a pure labor supply phenomenon, but firms can have strong incentives to send expensive older workers into retirement. Based on the seniority wage model developed by Lazear (1979), we discuss steep seniority wage profiles as incentives for firms to dismiss older workers before retirement. Conditional on individual retirement incentives, e.g., social security wealth or health status, the steepness of the wage profile will have different incentives for workers as compared to firms when it comes to the retirement date. Using an instrumental variable approach to account for selection of workers in our firms and for reverse causality, we find that firms with higher labor costs for older workers are associated with lower job exit age. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Firm incentives Retirement Seniority wages |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10729 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539560 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rudolf Winter-Ebmer,Gerard Thomas Horvath,Wolfgang Frimmel. DP10729 Seniority Wages and the Role of Firms in Retirement. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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