| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10751 |
| DP10751 The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information | |
| Georg Nöldeke | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-02 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results confirm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Costly voting Mixed strategy equilibrium Participation games Polynomials in bernstein form |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10751 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539582 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georg Nöldeke. DP10751 The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information. 2015. |
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