| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10758 |
| DP10758 A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis | |
| Philippe Jehiel; Laurent Lamy | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-09 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may possess private information as to how they value the various public goods in the various locations, and jurisdictions are free to choose whatever mechanism to attract citizens possibly after making some investments. It is shown that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare. Limitations of the result are discussed. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Competing exchange platforms Competing mechanisms Endogenous entry Free riding Local public goods Mechanism design Tiebout hypothesis |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10758 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539589 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Jehiel,Laurent Lamy. DP10758 A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis. 2015. |
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