| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10791 |
| DP10791 Information and Market Power | |
| Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris; Tibor Heumann | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-30 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that the nature of the private information determines the market power of the agents and thus price and volume of equilibrium trade. We provide a characterization of the set of all joint distributions over demands and payoff states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. In demand function competition, the agents condition their demand on the endogenous information contained in the price. We compare the set of feasible outcomes under demand function to the feasible outcomes under Cournot competition. We find that the first and second moments of the equilibrium distribution respond very differently to the private information of the agents under these two market structures. The first moment of the equilibrium demand, the average demand, is more sensitive to the nature of the private information in demand function competition, reflecting the strategic impact of private information. By contrast, the second moments are less sensitive to the private information, reflecting the common conditioning on the price among the agents. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bayes correlated equilibrium Demand function competition Incomplete information Linear best responses market power Moment restrictions Price impact Quadratic payoffs Supply function competition Volatility |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10791 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539622 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Bergemann,Stephen Morris,Tibor Heumann. DP10791 Information and Market Power. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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