| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10794 |
| DP10794 Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values | |
| Pieter A. Gautier; Guido Menzio | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-30 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in their classic paper. We propose an alternative extensive-form bargaining game, the Rolodex Game, that follows a simple and realistic protocol and that, under some mild restrictions, admits a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium generating a profile of wages and profits that are equal to the Shapley values. The vast applied literature that refers to the Stole and Zwiebel game to give a game-theoretic foundation to the use of the Shapley values as the outcome of the bargain between a firm and multiple workers should instead refer to the Rolodex game. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth |
| 关键词 | Intra firm bargaining Shapley value |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10794 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539624 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pieter A. Gautier,Guido Menzio. DP10794 Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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