| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10796 |
| DP10796 Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain | |
| Guido Friebel; Nick Zubanov; Matthias Heinz | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-30 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We test the effectiveness of team incentives by running a natural field experiment in a retail chain of 193 shops and 1,300 employees. As a response to intensified product market competition, the firm offered a bonus to shop teams for surpassing sales targets. A bonus to teams rather than individuals was a natural choice because the firm does not measure individual performance and relies on flexible task allocation among employees. On average, the team bonus increases sales and customer visits in the treated shops by around 3%, and wages by 2.3%. The bonus is highly profitable for the firm, generating for each bonus dollar an extra $3.80 of sales, and $2.10 of operational profit. The results show the importance of complementarities within teams and suggest that improved operational efficiency is the main mechanism behind the treatment effect. Our analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects offers a number of insights about the anatomy of teamwork. The firm decided to roll out the bonus to all of its shops, and the performance of treatment and control shops converged after the roll-out. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Management practices Randomized controlled trial (rct) Natural field experiment Insider econometrics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10796 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539626 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guido Friebel,Nick Zubanov,Matthias Heinz. DP10796 Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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