| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10799 |
| DP10799 Analysis of mergers in first-price auctions | |
| Christine Zulehner; Klaus Peter Gugler | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-30 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, we analyze mergers in bidding markets. We utilize data from procurement auctions in the Austrian construction sector and estimate models of first-price sealed-bid auctions. Based on estimated cost and markups, we run merger simulations and disentangle the market power effects from potential cost efficiencies. We analyze static and dynamic models of first price auctions, and compare the outcomes of the merger simulations with the actual effects of observed mergers. Our results show that market power and efficiency effects are present post merger, leading to increased markups, but leaving the winning bid essentially unaffected by the merger. We find a good correspondence of predicted and actual effects for full mergers, but not for majority acquisitions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Construction procurement Evaluation of mergers Independent private values First-price auctions Merger simulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10799 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539629 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christine Zulehner,Klaus Peter Gugler. DP10799 Analysis of mergers in first-price auctions. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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