| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10838 |
| DP10838 Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies | |
| Roland Strausz | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-09-20 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Uncertainty in election outcomes generates politically induced regulatory risk. Political parties' risk attitudes towards such risk depend on a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an output--expansion effect that benefits at least one party. Notwithstanding the parties' risk attitudes, political parties have incentives to negotiate away all regulatory risk by pre-electoral bargaining. Efficient pre-electoral bargaining outcomes fully eliminate politically induced regulatory risk. Political parties can implement such outcomes by institutionalizing politically independent regulatory agencies and endowing them with a specific objective. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Electoral uncertainty Independent regulatory agency Regulation Regulatory risk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10838 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539667 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roland Strausz. DP10838 Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies. 2015. |
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