G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10838
DP10838 Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies
Roland Strausz
发表日期2015-09-20
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要Uncertainty in election outcomes generates politically induced regulatory risk. Political parties' risk attitudes towards such risk depend on a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an output--expansion effect that benefits at least one party. Notwithstanding the parties' risk attitudes, political parties have incentives to negotiate away all regulatory risk by pre-electoral bargaining. Efficient pre-electoral bargaining outcomes fully eliminate politically induced regulatory risk. Political parties can implement such outcomes by institutionalizing politically independent regulatory agencies and endowing them with a specific objective.
主题Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词Electoral uncertainty Independent regulatory agency Regulation Regulatory risk
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10838
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539667
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Roland Strausz. DP10838 Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies. 2015.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Roland Strausz]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Roland Strausz]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Roland Strausz]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。