G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10812
DP10812 Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets
Kate Ho; Robin Lee
发表日期2015-09-30
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要The impact of insurer competition on welfare, negotiated provider prices, and premiums in the U.S. private health care industry is theoretically ambiguous. Reduced competition may increase the premiums charged by insurers and their payments made to hospitals. However, it may also strengthen insurers' bargaining leverage when negotiating with hospitals, thereby generating offsetting cost decreases. To understand and measure this trade-off, we estimate a model of employer-insurer and hospital-insurer bargaining over premiums and reimbursements, household demand for insurance, and individual demand for hospitals using detailed California admissions, claims, and enrollment data. We simulate the removal of both large and small insurers from consumers' choice sets. Although consumer welfare decreases and premiums typically increase, we find that premiums can fall upon the removal of a small insurer if an employer imposes effective premium constraints through negotiations with the remaining insurers. We also document substantial heterogeneity in hospital price adjustments upon the removal of an insurer, with renegotiated price increases and decreases of as much as 10% across markets.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Bargaining Health care markets Vertical contracts
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10812
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539685
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kate Ho,Robin Lee. DP10812 Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets. 2015.
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