| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10873 |
| DP10873 Electoral Incentives, Term Limits and the Sustainability of Peace | |
| Nicolas Sahuguet; Maurizio Zanardi; Paola Conconi | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-10-11 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autocracies, almost never fight each other. We develop a theoretical model to examine the sustainability of international peace between democracies and autocracies, where the crucial difference between these two political regimes is whether or not policymakers are subject to periodic elections. We show that the fear of losing office can make it less tempting for democratic leaders to wage war against other countries. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can be re-elected, suggesting that democracies with term limits should be more conflict prone, particularly when the executive is serving the last possible term. These results rationalize recent empirical findings on how term limits affect the propensity of democracies to engage in conflicts. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Democratic peace Elections Interstate conflicts Term limits. |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10873 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539703 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicolas Sahuguet,Maurizio Zanardi,Paola Conconi. DP10873 Electoral Incentives, Term Limits and the Sustainability of Peace. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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