| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10888 |
| DP10888 Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters | |
| Guido Tabellini; Filip Matějka | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-10-18 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies how voters optimally allocate costly attention in a model of probabilistic voting. The equilibrium solves a modified social planning problem that reflects voters? choice of attention. Voters are more attentive when their stakes are higher, when their cost of information is lower and prior uncertainty is higher. We explore the implications of this in a variety of applications. In equilibrium, extremist voters are more influential and public goods are under-provided. The analysis also yields predictions about the equilibrium pattern of information, and about policy divergence by two opportunistic candidates. Endogenous attention can lead to multiple equilibria, explaining how poor voters in developing countries can be politically empowered by welfare programs. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Behavioural political economy Electoral competition Rational inattention Salience |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10888 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539718 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guido Tabellini,Filip Matějka. DP10888 Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters. 2015. |
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