| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10907 |
| DP10907 Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions | |
| Gabrielle Fack; Julien Grenet; Yinghua He | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-10-25 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose novel approaches and tests for estimating student preferences with data from centralized matching mechanisms, like the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance, when students are strictly ranked by, e.g., test scores. Without requiring truth-telling to be the unique equilibrium, we show that the matching is (asymptotically) stable, or justi?ed-envy-free, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she is quali?ed for ex post. Having illustrated the approaches in simulations, we apply them to school choice data from Paris and demonstrate evidence supporting stability but not truth-telling. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | College admissions Gale-shapley deferred acceptance mechanism Stable matching School choice Student preferences |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10907 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539737 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gabrielle Fack,Julien Grenet,Yinghua He. DP10907 Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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