| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10912 |
| DP10912 Voting and contributing when the group is watching | |
| [unavailable] | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in particular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We draw surprising policy implications, on the effect of group size, of supermajority rules and of the observability of actions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Image concern Information aggregation Public good Voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10912 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539742 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | [unavailable]. DP10912 Voting and contributing when the group is watching. 2015. |
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