| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10914 |
| DP10914 Demand-Driven Integration and Divorcement Policy | |
| Andrew Newman | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Industrial organization's concern with vertical integration has traditionally been limited to considering the effects on market outcomes, in particular product prices: they increase because integration enhances market power, or they decrease because it yields efficiency gains. This note offers a theoretical argument for reverse causality, from prices -- more generally, demand -- to integration. If, as many organizational theories in suggest, integration has positive effects on production efficiency and has any costs that are largely independent of output, then bearing those costs is more attractive when prices are higher, as when there is high demand. Therefore high prices lead to more integration. We discuss evidence for this reverse causality and its implications for regulation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Oio Reverse causality Theory of the firm Vertical integration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10914 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539744 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Newman. DP10914 Demand-Driven Integration and Divorcement Policy. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Andrew Newman]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Andrew Newman]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Andrew Newman]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
