| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10941 |
| DP10941 Cross-Licensing and Competition | |
| Doh-Shin Jeon; Yassine Lefouili | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-11-22 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study bilateral cross-licensing agreements among N (>2) competing firms. We find that the industry-profit-maximizing royalty can be sustained as the outcome of bilaterally efficient agreements. This holds regardless of whether agreements are public or private and whether firms compete in quantities or prices. We extend this monopolization result to a general class of two-stage games in which firms bilaterally agree in the first stage to make each other payments that depend on their second-stage non-cooperative actions. Policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Antitrust and intellectual property Collusion Cross-licensing Royalties |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10941 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539771 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Doh-Shin Jeon,Yassine Lefouili. DP10941 Cross-Licensing and Competition. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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