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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP10950 |
DP10950 Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-Default | |
Christoph Trebesch; Tamon Asonuma | |
发表日期 | 2015-11-22 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Sovereign debt restructurings can be implemented preemptively - prior to a payment default. We code a comprehensive new dataset and find that preemptive restructurings (i) are frequent (38% of all deals 1978-2010), (ii) have lower haircuts, (iii) are quicker to negotiate, and (iv) see lower output losses. To rationalize these stylized facts, we build a quantitative sovereign debt model that incorporates preemptive and post-default renegotiations. The model improves the fit with the data and explains the sovereign's optimal choice: preemptive restructurings occur when default risk is high ex-ante, while defaults occur after unexpected bad shocks. Empirical evidence supports these predictions. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
关键词 | Crisis resolution Debt restructuring Default Sovereign debt |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10950 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539779 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christoph Trebesch,Tamon Asonuma. DP10950 Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-Default. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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