| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10959 |
| DP10959 Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence | |
| Jo Seldeslachts; Tomaso Duso; Joseph A. Clougherty | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-11-29 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as ? unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions ? phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Competition policy Deterrence European commission Merger policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10959 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539788 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jo Seldeslachts,Tomaso Duso,Joseph A. Clougherty. DP10959 Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
