| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP10969
|
| DP10969 Information, authority, and smooth communication in organizations |
| Dezso Szalay; Inga Deimen
|
| 发表日期 | 2015-12-06
|
| 出版年 | 2015
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Two divisions of a firm, overarched by a headquarters, are engaged in a decision problem. Division one obtains information and informs division two who has the formal authority to make the decision. Headquarters guides the decision process by affecting the quality of information that division one obtains. In equilibrium, division one honestly communicates the inferences drawn from its observations, but not the underlying observations themselves and division two takes the advice at face value. The communication equilibrium involves smooth strategies and is outcome equivalent to delegation: the informed party gets its way, regardless of the allocation of formal authority. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Authority
Delegation
Endogenous information
Strategic communication
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10969
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539798
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Dezso Szalay,Inga Deimen. DP10969 Information, authority, and smooth communication in organizations. 2015.
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