| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10983 |
| DP10983 Competition in Treasury Auctions | |
| Christine Zulehner; Philipp Schmidt-Dengler | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-12-13 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria?s EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders? private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance: We find that increased competition reduced bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Competition Multiunit auctions Structural estimation Treasury auctions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10983 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539812 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christine Zulehner,Philipp Schmidt-Dengler. DP10983 Competition in Treasury Auctions. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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