G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP10987
DP10987 Disability Benefit Generosity and Labor Force Withdrawal
Stefan Staubli
发表日期2015-12-13
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要A key component for estimating the optimal size and structure of disability insurance (DI) programs is the elasticity of DI claiming with respect to benefit generosity. Yet, in many countries, including the United States, all workers face identical benefit schedules, which are a function of one?s labor market history, making it difficult to separate the effect of the benefit level from the effect of unobserved preferences for work on individuals? claiming decisions. To circumvent this problem, we exploit exogenous variation in DI benefits in Austria arising from several reforms to its DI and old age pension system in the 1990s and 2000s. We use comprehensive administrative social security records data on the universe of Austrian workers to compute benefit levels under six different regimes, allowing us to identify and precisely estimate the elasticity of DI claiming with respect to benefit generosity. We find that, over this time period, a one percent increase in potential DI benefits was associated with a 1.2 percent increase in DI claiming.
主题Labour Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Benefit generosity Claiming elasticity Disability insurance Labor force withdrawal
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp10987
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539816
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Stefan Staubli. DP10987 Disability Benefit Generosity and Labor Force Withdrawal. 2015.
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