| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP10994 |
| DP10994 Residual Deterrence | |
| Daniel Garrett; Francesc Dilmé | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or "residual deterrence". We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. Our theory rests on the costs of reallocating enforcement resources. In light of these costs, we study the determinants of offending such as the role of public information about enforcement and offending. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Deterrence Enforcement Reputation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp10994 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539823 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Garrett,Francesc Dilmé. DP10994 Residual Deterrence. 2015. |
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