G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11000
DP11000 Writing-down debt with heterogeneous creditors: lock laws and late swap
Marcus Miller; Sayantan Ghosal
发表日期2015-12-20
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要The presence of ?holdouts? in recent sovereign debt swaps poses a challenge to bargaining models which assume all creditors to be homogeneous. We modify the Rubinstein ?alternating offers? framework so as to accommodate exogenous creditor heterogeneity - specifically holdouts more patient than other bondholders. The ?second best? equilibrium derived is an initial offer and an associated ?lock-law? sufficient to tempt impatient creditors into a prompt bond exchange. This is followed by a delayed, but more generous, swap with the patient creditors, timed to take place when the lock-law expires. In practice, however, the presence of holdouts may be endogenous: they may be late-comers who buy distressed bonds with a view to litigating for the full face value plus their costs of waiting. Provisions for protecting other bond holders from the negative externality caused by such tactics are briefly discussed. However, where the judge has mandated good faith bargaining with holdout creditors, the bargaining outcome we derive may be useful to indicate a basis for compromise
主题International Macroeconomics and Finance
关键词Sovereign debt restructuring Bargaining Holdouts Delay Lock law Second-best
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11000
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539829
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marcus Miller,Sayantan Ghosal. DP11000 Writing-down debt with heterogeneous creditors: lock laws and late swap. 2015.
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